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Recent research has highlighted the role of prosocial personality traits—agreeableness
and honesty-humility—in egalitarian distributions of wealth in the dictator game.
Expanding on these findings, we ran two studies to examine individual differences in
two other forms of prosociality—generosity and reciprocity—with respect to two major
models of personality, the Big Five and the HEXACO. Participants (combined N = 560)
completed a series of economic games in which allocations in the dictator game were
compared with those in the generosity game, a non-constant-sum wealth distribution
task where proposers with fixed payoffs selected the size of their partner’s payoff
(“generosity”). We further examined positive and negative reciprocity by manipulating
a partner’s previous move (“reciprocity”). Results showed clear evidence of both
generosity and positive reciprocity in social preferences, with allocations to a partner
greater in the generosity game than in the dictator game, and greater still when a
player had been previously assisted by their partner. There was also a consistent
interaction with gender, whereby men were more generous when this was costless and
women were more egalitarian overall. Furthermore, these distinct forms of prosociality
were differentially predicted by personality traits, in line with the core features of
these traits and the theoretical distinctions between them. HEXACO honesty-humility
predicted dictator, but not generosity allocations, while traits capturing tendencies
toward irritability and anger predicted lower generosity, but not dictator allocations.
In contrast, the politeness—but not compassion—aspect of Big Five agreeableness
was uniquely and broadly associated with prosociality across all games. These findings
support the discriminant validity between related prosocial constructs, and have
important implications for understanding the motives and mechanisms taking place
within economic games.
Keywords: dictator game, social preferences, honesty-humility, agreeableness, politeness, compassion, big five,
HEXACO
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INTRODUCTION
One of the major themes in the literature on economic games
is that humans care about and are motivated by the interests
of others. These other-regarding or social preferences are the
building blocks of prosocial behavior and have been incorporated
into various economic models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). A second major theme to emerge
from this literature is the substantial heterogeneity in people’s
social preferences and behaviors despite being exposed to
the same experimental conditions (Fischbacher et al., 2001;
Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Measures of social
value orientation, which capture motivational differences in the
distribution of resources, reveal a variety of archetypes, including
altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive (Murphy
and Ackermann, 2014). Recent studies have also documented
stable patterns of prosocial behavior correlated over time and
across different games (Yamagishi et al., 2013; Peysakhovich et al.,
2014).
One potential source of this heterogeneity rests in broad
dispositions capturing consistent and enduring patterns in
behavior and experience. Specifically, personality traits are
“probabilistic descriptions of relatively stable patterns of
emotion, motivation, cognition, and behavior, in response to
classes of stimuli that have been present in human cultures
over evolutionary time” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 35). A long line of
research has documented how basic prosocial personality traits—
known as agreeableness and honesty-humility—contribute to
experimental and real-world instances of prosociality, including
helping, volunteering, charitable giving, and ethical decision
making (e.g., Elshaug and Metzer, 2001; Carlo et al., 2005;
Penner et al., 2005; Ozer and Benet-Martínez, 2006; Graziano
et al., 2007; Ashton and Lee, 2008; Aghababaei et al., 2014).
It is not surprising, then, that the same prosocial traits have
begun to emerge as significant predictors of inequality aversion,
egalitarianism, and fairness in economic games (Hilbig et al.,
2014; Zhao et al., 2016; for a review, see Zhao and Smillie, 2015).
In the current paper, we extend this nascent literature
by applying a framework of distinct prosocial traits to a
broader range of social preferences beyond egalitarianism. We
first present an overview of the prosocial domains of major
personality models and discuss their relevance for distributive
and reciprocal preferences in economic games. Building on the
design of the traditional dictator game, we develop a novel
paradigm that simultaneously tests for two other forms of social
preference beyond egalitarianism: generosity and reciprocity.
Prosocial Domains of Major Personality
Models
Prosociality is a general term referring to a variety of
positive emotions, attitudes, and behaviors directed toward
others, which may be manifested through acts of sharing,
helping, and cooperating (Knafo-Noam et al., 2015). There is
increasing recognition that neither prosociality nor its underlying
motivations are unitary constructs (Batson and Powell, 2003;
Singer and Steinbeis, 2009; Böckler et al., 2016). Likewise, there
are multiple prosocial tendencies, which are classified differently
according to two major taxonomic models of personality, the Big
Five (Goldberg, 1981; Digman, 1990; John et al., 2008; DeYoung,
2015) and the HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality,
eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to
Experience; Lee and Ashton, 2004).
Prosocial Domains of the Big Five: Agreeableness
and Its Aspects of Politeness and Compassion
The Five-Factor Model or “Big Five” is a robust hierarchical
taxonomy of personality dimensions recovered from a number
of measures of trait descriptors (John et al., 2008) and replicable
across languages and cultures (Digman, 1990). Each factor
represents a major dimension of covariation among traits,
subsuming a number of narrower personality characteristics at
intermediate (known as aspects) and lower (known as facets)
levels (DeYoung et al., 2007; DeYoung, 2015).
Within the Big Five model, agreeableness captures tendencies
toward altruism and cooperation, and has a core underlying
motivation of maintaining interpersonal harmony (Graziano
and Eisenberg, 1997). Consistent with this, agreeableness is the
Big Five dimension most frequently associated with prosocial
behaviors in a variety of economic games, including allocations
of wealth in the dictator game (Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Becker et al.,
2012; Baumert et al., 2014), acceptance of unfair offers in the
ultimatum game (Mehta, 2007), cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma (Kagel and McGee, 2014), contributions in the public
goods game (Volk et al., 2011), and amounts invested and
returned to others in the trust game (Evans and Revelle, 2008;
Becker et al., 2012; for a review, see Zhao and Smillie, 2015).
However, Big Five agreeableness is a broad domain of
personality which can be divided into two distinct aspects:
politeness, the tendency to respect others, adhere to social norms,
and suppress aggressive impulses, and compassion, the tendency
to be emotionally concerned about others (DeYoung et al.,
2007; DeYoung, 2015). Though correlated, the two often show
diverging associations with other individual differences. For
instance, while politeness is associated with the moral foundation
of authority/respect and political conservatism, compassion is
more strongly linked with the moral foundations of harm/care
and fairness/reciprocity, as well as political liberalism (Hirsh
et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 2013). This distinction between
politeness and compassion also has important implications
for the study of heterogeneity in economic games, where
prosocial behaviors in different games may stem from different
motivations, such as adhering to normative rules around sharing
and cooperating (e.g., the public goods game), or helping needy
others (e.g., third party punishment and recompensation).
Prosocial Domains of the HEXACO: Honesty-Humility
and Agreeableness
A major alternative to the Big Five is the HEXACO model, a six-
factor model of personality developed from psycholexical studies
in European and Asian languages (Lee and Ashton, 2004; Ashton
and Lee, 2007; Ashton et al., 2014). The most salient difference
between the HEXACO and the Big Five is the addition of a
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sixth dimension, honesty-humility, or the tendency to be sincere,
modest, and fair, which is believed to capture trait variance
beyond the Big Five. Moreover, the HEXACO representation
of agreeableness and emotionality (neuroticism) are rotational
variants of their Big Five counterparts (Ashton and Lee, 2007).
Specifically, HEXACO agreeableness reflects the tendency to be
patient, forgiving, and tolerant, and is thus non-interchangeable
with Big Five agreeableness, which reflects broad tendencies
toward altruism.
Together, HEXACO honesty-humility and HEXACO
agreeableness span the prosocial domain typically captured by
Big Five agreeableness and make up two forms of individual
variation in reciprocal altruism. Honesty-Humility represents
active cooperation, the tendency to cooperate with others despite
the opportunity for exploitation, while HEXACO agreeableness
represents reactive cooperation, the tendency to cooperate with
others despite their misgivings (Hilbig et al., 2013; Ashton et al.,
2014). The two diverge in studies of workplace delinquency
(Lee et al., 2005), criminality (Rolison et al., 2013), dishonesty
and cheating (Hilbig and Zettler, 2015), and forgiveness and
revenge (Lee and Ashton, 2012). This discriminant validity
is also relevant to behavior within economic games, where
there is evidence of a “cooperative phenotype,” characterized by
within-individual correlations across cooperative games (i.e., fair
and cooperative tendencies corresponding to honesty-humility),
which is independent from norm-enforcing punishment (i.e.,
retaliatory tendencies corresponding to HEXACO agreeableness;
Peysakhovich et al., 2014).
In summary, the Big Five and HEXACO models provide
an array of distinct prosocial traits which reflect different
motivations and mechanisms, and which show divergent validity
with respect to interpersonal and socio-political variables (see
Table 1). We now turn to the experimental economics literature,
where similar distinctions may exist between different facets of
prosociality and which are expressed through multiple social
preferences in games.
Multiple Social Preferences in Economic
Games
Inequality Aversion and Egalitarianism
One basic way in which social preferences deviate from
narrow self-interest is the desire for equality. Egalitarianism
is a basic motivation that can be traced back to small-scale
societies in human evolutionary history (Boehm, 1999) and
is the cornerstone of economic theories of social preferences
(Loewenstein et al., 1989; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000). The tension between self-interest and equality
is best captured in the dictator game, in which one player decides
how to split a fixed amount of money with a second player,
who must accept this unconditionally (Kahneman et al., 1986;
Forsythe et al., 1994). Featuring in more than a hundred studies,
the popularity of the dictator game owes to the fact that it
is a simple yet powerful paradigm which yields considerable
behavioral variation (Engel, 2011). While average allocations to
a partner range between 20% and 30% of the pie, up to half of
participants keep all the money, a quarter split it equally, and the
remainder select distributions in between (Tisserand et al., 2015).
This heterogeneity thus makes the dictator game an ideal hunting
ground for examining the influence of personality and for teasing
apart the roles of similar but distinct personality constructs.
For example, Big Five agreeableness is a consistent predictor of
egalitarian dictator allocations (for a review, see Zhao and Smillie,
2015). However, recent research indicates that this is driven by
its aspect of politeness—or tendencies toward good manners
and etiquette—rather than compassion (Zhao et al., 2016), in
keeping with the economics literature on the importance of social
norms for prosociality (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Another kind
of dissociation has emerged within the HEXACO model, with
several studies showing that honesty-humility (or the tendency
for active cooperation)—but not HEXACO agreeableness—is a
strong, consistent, and robust predictor of egalitarian dictator
allocations, and even more so than Big Five agreeableness (Hilbig
and Zettler, 2009; Thielmann and Hilbig, 2014; Hilbig et al.,
2015a, 2013; Zhao et al., 2016; for a review, see Zhao and Smillie,
2015).
Costless Prosociality and Generosity
Despite the wealth of findings it has generated, the dictator game
is limited when drawing inferences about a wider array of social
preferences. Notably, the constant-sum structure of the game
means that decisions to benefit one’s partner are always at a cost
to self-interest by the same magnitude. However, many instances
of real-world prosociality involve decisions which benefit others
at minimal personal cost, such as giving pre-loved belongings
to charity and posthumous organ donation (Saunders, 2012;
Moorlock et al., 2014; Shepherd et al., 2014). In this paper, we
use the term generosity to describe the willingness to accept a
relative disadvantage when this makes others better off (either at
a personal cost or at no cost), but it should not be confused with
other usages in the literature (e.g., Haley and Fessler, 2005).
Acts of generosity are typically obscured by dominant norms
of equality in constant-sum games, such as the dictator game,
where fewer than 5% of individuals allocate more than half the
endowment to their partner (Tisserand et al., 2015). However,
acts of generosity emerge in tasks of costless prosociality where
they may reflect concerns for efficiency and social welfare
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr et al., 2008; Bartling et al., 2009;
Güth, 2010). In their study of egalitarianism in children, Fehr
et al. (2008) used an envy game in which participants chose
between one unit each (1,1) or one for themselves and two for
their partner (1,2), finding that although egalitarian preferences
dominated at ages 7–8, they were gradually replaced by generosity
in older ages (Fehr et al., 2013).
In adults, costless prosociality has been incorporated into
modified dictator games consisting of simple allocation tasks,
such as selecting an efficient but personally disadvantageous
(400,750) choice over an egalitarian (400,400) one (Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). The generosity
game has been specifically designed to examine efficiency
concerns, in which individuals choose the size of the overall
pie when their own share is fixed (Güth, 2010; Güth et al.,
2012). When there is no trade-off between self- and other-
interests, most individuals maximize their partner’s payoff, with
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TABLE 1 | Prosocial domains of the Big Five and HEXACO models of personality.
Personality dimension Defining characteristic Known roles in relevant games
Big Five model
Agreeableness Broad tendencies toward altruism and
cooperation
• Fair allocations of wealth
• Amount returned in trust game
• Acceptance in ultimatum game
Politeness Tendency to adhere to social norms; alignment
with the group
• Fair allocations of wealth
Compassion Tendency to be emotionally concerned about
others; alignment with another individual
HEXACO model
Honesty-Humility Tendency to cooperate despite opportunities
for exploitation; active cooperation
• Fair allocations of wealth
• Amount returned in trust game
Agreeableness Tendency to cooperate despite the misgivings
of others; reactive cooperation
• Acceptance in ultimatum game
For a discussion of the role of empathic concern (compassion) as alignment with other individuals and social norms (politeness) as alignment to one’s group, see Jensen
et al. (2014). Within the HEXACO model, honesty-humility and agreeableness are thought to represent two complementary aspects of reciprocal altruism. In addition,
HEXACO emotionality, the tendency to be sentimental and oversensitive, is believed to relate to the construct of kin altruism (Ashton and Lee, 2007; Ashton et al., 2014).
However, this dimension is beyond the scope of the current research, which focuses on prosocial behavior among non-kin.
a substantial portion preferring equal shares and a minority
minimizing their partner’s payoffs (Güth et al., 2012). At
the other end of the spectrum, choosing to hurt another
or refusing to help them when there is little personal gain
may represent purer forms of spite or envy (Abbink and
Sadrieh, 2009). Studies using joy-of-destruction games show that
some individuals—almost 40% of concealed game decisions—
are willing to reduce the payoffs of others even when they
do not benefit directly (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Zhang and
Ortmann, 2016). Clearly there is much individual variation in
costless prosocial and antisocial behaviors—perhaps more so
than when decisions are costly and self-interest is a strong
driver of uniform responding—and these differences may
be reconciled by examining the role of relevant personality
constructs, including tendencies toward benevolence, lenience,
and spite.
Positive and Negative Reciprocity
In addition to distributive preferences that govern egalitarianism
and generosity, another major influence deeply embedded within
social interactions are reciprocal preferences (Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Reciprocity is the tendency to
return others’ favors and to retaliate against others’ wrongdoing
(Gouldner, 1960) and is believed to underlie the evolution and
maintenance of human cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Komorita and Parks, 1999; Bowles and Gintis, 2004).
In economics, behavioral signatures of positive and negative
reciprocity are often studied in the second player roles of the trust
and ultimatum games, respectively (e.g., Fehr et al., 2002; Becker
et al., 2012).
Individual differences in the tendency to reciprocate are well
documented (Gallucci and Perugini, 2000; Ackermann et al.,
2014), and self-reported reciprocity is associated with major life
and economic outcomes (Dohmen et al., 2009). However, the
exact relations between positive and negative reciprocity and
narrower personality traits are less clear, particularly given the
highly conditional nature of reciprocity. For example, positive
reciprocators not only need to be sensitive to positive gestures
from others, but also have a behavioral propensity to respond to
these positively (Perugini et al., 2003).
Within the Big Five model, self-reported positive reciprocity
is positively correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness,
while negative reciprocity is negatively correlated with the same
two traits, and positively with neuroticism (Perugini et al., 2003;
Dohmen et al., 2008). Interestingly, all three traits predict the
same outcomes—work effort, unemployment, and subjective
wellbeing—associated with individual differences in negative
and positive reciprocity, providing further evidence of their
overlap (Ozer and Benet-Martínez, 2006; Dohmen et al., 2009).
Consistent with these self-reported findings, agreeableness is the
Big Five trait most frequently associated with reciprocal behavior
in economic games, where it predicts the acceptance of unfair
offers in the ultimatum game (Mehta, 2007; Li and Chen, 2012)
and greater amounts returned to a sender in the trust game
(Evans and Revelle, 2008; Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Becker
et al., 2012; Müller and Schwieren, 2012; but see Thielmann and
Hilbig, 2015).
Furthermore, the HEXACO model and its partitioning of
the prosocial domain into active (i.e., honesty-humility) and
reactive (i.e., agreeableness) forms of reciprocal altruism is ideally
suited to the finer-grained analysis of positive and negative
reciprocity in economic games. HEXACO agreeableness has
been negatively associated with self-reported negative reciprocity
(Perugini et al., 2003) and shown to predict acceptance of
unfair offers in ultimatum games (Hilbig et al., 2013; Thielmann
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et al., 2014). Meanwhile, honesty-humility has been found to
predict trustworthiness, measured by the amount returned in
the trust game (Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015). However, this
was independent of prior trust, suggesting that the relation is
likely driven by a mechanism of “unconditional kindness” (i.e.,
giving in the absence of any previous or future interaction
with one’s partner, such as in a one-shot dictator game),
rather than positive reciprocity per se (Thielmann and Hilbig,
2015). Other research using wealth redistribution paradigms
similarly found that the behavioral expression of honesty-
humility is less conditional on fairness norms overall and instead
resembles an overall pattern of benevolence (Hilbig et al.,
2015b).
The Current Research
Social preferences represent a number of channels through
which humans deviate from narrow self-interest and engage in
prosocial behaviors. Distributive preferences capture concerns
for egalitarianism and generosity, while preferences for
reciprocity promote favorable or unfavorable treatment
conditional on the previous acts or intentions of others.
Emerging research has demonstrated considerable heterogeneity
in these preferences, which may be partially underpinned by
prosocial personality traits. However, most of this research
has focused on the trade-off between self- and other-regarding
interests in the dictator game. Detailed relations between
prosocial personality traits and other forms of social preferences
are less well understood, and inferences are often cobbled
together from a mixture of different games and personality
measures. As a result, it is difficult to disentangle trait effects
from the influence of contextual factors across variable
game environments (given that traits too are contextualized;
DeYoung, 2015) and to interpret the findings when certain
game decisions are used to approximate social preferences (e.g.,
the trust game, which may not capture positive reciprocity;
Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Thielmann and Hilbig,
2015).
The aims of the current research were threefold: (1) To
identify a richer set of social preferences beyond egalitarianism
and inequality aversion, (2) to examine the source of individual
differences in these preferences using theoretical models of
distinct prosocial traits, and in doing so, (3) address some of
the major limitations of the existing literature (e.g., fragmented
games and traits).
We developed a novel paradigm using six simple
modifications of the dictator game to test multiple social
preferences. This design was inspired by Charness and Rabin
(2002), who incorporated reciprocity and efficiency concerns
into a series of binary-choice tasks. We first manipulated
the costliness of decisions by setting half the games as
constant-sum (i.e., costly dictator games) and half with a
fixed personal payoff but variable partner payoff (i.e., costless
generosity games). Second, we manipulated the conditions
for reciprocity by positioning these games after a prior
decision by a partner that hurt or helped the participant,
vs. a baseline condition where there was no history with a
partner.
The benefit of this design is that it provided a suite of
tightly controlled and manipulable conditions ideal for localizing
specific prosocial constructs. For example, comparing costly
vs. costless game decisions allowed us to identify different
patterns of behavior after controlling for the influence of self-
interest. Similarly, reciprocal tendencies can be teased apart
from overall altruistic motivations. Existing studies suggest
that Big Five agreeableness and HEXACO honesty-humility are
associated positively with positive reciprocity and negatively
with negative reciprocity, but these preferences have been
largely considered in isolation. Given that these traits are
already associated with greater dictator allocations, the current
design will reveal whether they produce an additional effect
for reciprocity, above and beyond unconditional kindness
(Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Thielmann and Hilbig,
2015).
We then examined the sources of heterogeneity within this
paradigm with respect to the theoretically relevant prosocial
domain of personality: agreeableness and its aspects of politeness
and compassion within the Big Five model, and honesty-humility
and agreeableness within the HEXACO model. In particular, we
focused on the discriminant validity between similar prosocial
personality constructs and identified unique trait effects to help
shed light on the specific mechanisms and motivations taking
place within economic games (for a recent example, see Zhao
et al., 2016). We sought to address some of the limitations and
expand on the existing research by bringing together two large
and relatively diverse community samples. Sample sizes in both
studies (Ns = 304, 256) were well above the recommended
minimum provided in the wake of the replicability crisis,
including total N > 150 for individual differences research (Mar
et al., 2013) and total N > 180 as a general requirement for
personality and social psychological research (Vazire, 2016). As
the design was within-subjects, the per condition sample sizes
provided 80% power to identify effect sizes of approximately
rs = 0.16–0.18 (Faul et al., 2009), which is reasonably sensitive
given the average effect sizes in the field (r = 0.21; Richard et al.,
2003; Fraley and Marks, 2007).
In line with previous research, we expected politeness
from the Big Five model to be uniquely associated with
costly prosocial allocations (i.e., dictator games) but expected
compassion to play a relatively stronger role in costless
prosocial allocations (i.e., generosity games), where allocations
are less norm-driven and capture motivations of improving
the wellbeing of others. Within the HEXACO model,
we predicted that honesty-humility would have a unique
role in both costly and costless prosociality, given its core
characteristic of benevolence. Furthermore, we hypothesized
that HEXACO agreeableness—which captures tendencies
toward forgiveness and non-retaliation—would be negatively
associated with negative reciprocity. Finally, in light of the
evidence demonstrating the role of Big Five agreeableness and
HEXACO honesty-humility in both positive reciprocal game
behaviors and dictator game allocations, we were interested in
examining whether any prosocial traits could explain positive
reciprocity beyond their established role in unconditional
kindness.
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STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Advisory Group of
the Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University
of Melbourne. All participants provided informed consent via an
electronic survey according to the established guidelines of the
Group.
Participants
The final sample consisted of 304 North American participants
(aged 18–65 years, Mage = 30.90, SD = 9.89; 55% female)
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Only
workers with fewer than 50 Human Intelligence Tasks were
selected to avoid recruiting those who were familiar with
economic game paradigms.
Personality Measures
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007)
Participants completed the 100-item BFAS, a measure of the
five broad domains of personality (neuroticism, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness/intellect) and
their lower-level aspects. Of particular interest was the prosocial
domain of agreeableness, including its aspects of politeness (e.g.,
“insult people”) and compassion (e.g., “inquire about others’
wellbeing”). These were each measured with 10 items on a five-
point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). The
BFAS is a well-validated measure of the Big Five and has good
internal consistency and test–retest reliability (DeYoung et al.,
2007).
HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-PI-R;
Lee and Ashton, 2004)
Participants also completed the 100-item HEXACO-PI-R, an
alternative measure of personality comprising six broad trait
domains. Of particular interest were the prosocial domains of
honesty-humility (e.g., “I am an ordinary person who is no better
than others”) and agreeableness (e.g., “I rarely hold a grudge,
even against people who have badly wronged me”). Each trait is
measured with 16 items on a five-point Likert scale (1= strongly
disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and has good internal consistency
(Lee and Ashton, 2004)1.
Procedure
Participants completed demographic questions, personality
measures, and economic games on a survey programmed using
Qualtrics Survey Software and administered through the MTurk
requester interface. The BFAS and the HEXACO-PI-R were
presented one after the other in a randomized order. The survey
consisted of additional questionnaires and economic games
1In addition, an interstitial scale, altruism, represents a blend of HEXACO honesty-
humility, agreeableness, and emotionality (e.g., “I have sympathy for people who
are less fortunate than I am”; Ashton et al., 2014). Given its extensive overlap with
prosocial domains from both personality models (and the focus of the current
study on distinct prosocial traits) and its relatively lower reliability (Cronbach’s
αs = 0.62, 0.71), data for this scale were not included in the main analysis but
can be found in the Supplementary Material (see Supplementary Table S2).
beyond the scope of the current research, including a hypothetical
real-world economic decision-making task. The 200 items of the
personality questionnaires served as a filler task between this and
the current games of interest, and thus were expected to prevent
any carryover effects.
All economic games were hypothetical, that is, participants
were asked to imagine that they were playing the games with
an anonymous partner who was described as another participant
that they would not knowingly meet. To check the validity
of responses, participants also completed two attention checks
embedded in the personality measures (e.g., “Please select
Strongly Agree”). Thirty-six (11%) participants were excluded for
failing at least one of these attention checks. Participants were
paid US$2.00 and the median time spent on the study was 30 min.
Economic games
Participants played six economic games that were loosely based
on a larger set of dictator and response games developed by
Charness and Rabin (2002). All six games required the participant
to select their preferred choice out of 11 combinations of payoffs
for themselves and their partner, represented by imagined dollar
amounts. All games were presented in a randomized order.
The six games were set up using a 2 (game type: dictator vs.
generosity) × 3 (reciprocity: baseline, help, and hurt) repeated
measures design, depicted in Figure 1. There were two types of
games: dictator and generosity games. In the three dictator games
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994), participants were
asked to indicate their preferred choice out of 11 different payoff
combinations, each of which summed to $10. These ranged from
$0 for oneself and $10 for one’s partner to $10 for oneself and $0
for one’s partner, varying in $1 increments.
In the three generosity games (based on Güth et al., 2009,
2012; Güth, 2010)2, participants were again asked to indicate their
preferred selection out of 11 different payoff combinations. This
time, their own payoff was always fixed at $5 and the choices
ranged from $0 to $10 for their partner, varying in $1 increments.
In addition, there were three types of reciprocity conditions:
baseline, help, and hurt. In the two baseline games, participants
were asked to indicate their preferred selection with no
information provided about their partner. In the four remaining
games, participants were provided information about their
partner’s previous move, which involved passing on a decision
that either helped or hurt the participant. In the two help games,
participants read that their partner had passed on a decision
with a payoff of $0 to the participant, opting instead to defer
to the participant to choose from the list of current options.
In the two hurt games, participants read that their partner had
passed on a decision with a payoff of $15 (dictator version) or
$10 (generosity version) to the participant, opting instead to
defer to the participant. In other words, the partner’s move in
the help condition prevented the participant from going away
2While our generosity game was inspired by that designed by Güth et al., (2009,
2012) and Güth (2010), the two are not the same as players in the latter decide on
the size of the entire pie so that the partner is the residual claimant. In contrast,
our participants directly selected the payoffs for their partner, which aided ease of
understanding for participants and allowed comparability with dictator games in
our analysis.
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FIGURE 1 | Study design depicting the three reciprocity conditions and the two game types. Payoffs were represented as imagined dollars (Study 1) or
points corresponding to dollar amounts (Study 2). Participants’ payoffs are always listed first in payoff combinations.
empty-handed, while their move in the hurt condition resulted
in the participant missing out on $15 (dictator version) or $10
(generosity version). These different forgone payoffs between
the dictator and generosity games correspond to the maximum
amounts that could be earned in each of these games ($10 in the
dictator game, $5 in the generosity game).
To summarize, this experimental setup would thus reveal
an effect for generosity if there were greater allocations in the
generosity games relative to the dictator game (i.e., a main effect
for game type). In addition, reciprocity would be evident from
varying allocations of wealth between the baseline, help, and
hurt games (i.e., a main effect of reciprocity), in which higher
allocations in the help games would be indicative of positive
reciprocity and lower allocations in the hurt games indicative of
negative reciprocity.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Statistics
Game decisions
Mean allocations to a partner in each of the six economic
bargaining games are presented in the left panel of Figure 2. A 2
(game type: dictator vs. generosity) × 3 (reciprocity: baseline,
help, and hurt) repeated measures ANOVA was performed.
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied for sphericity
violations of reciprocity, χ2(2) = 29.92, p < 0.001 (ε = 0.91),
and its interaction with game type, χ2(2) = 14.62, p = 0.001
(ε= 0.96). There was a main effect for game type, with allocations
in generosity games (M = 6.62) higher than those in dictator
games (M= 4.70), F(1,303)= 212.12, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.41. There
was also a main effect for reciprocity, F(1.83,553.77) = 15.68,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.05, for which allocations in the baseline
games (M = 5.54) were significantly lower than in help games
(M = 5.98), F(1,303) = 27.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08, but not in
hurt games (M = 5.46), F(1,303) = 0.57, p = 0.45, η2p = 0.002.
These findings thus indicate generosity and positive reciprocity,
but not negative reciprocity.
Demographic variables
Age and gender are important demographic variables frequently
associated with social preferences (Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001; for a discussion of age-related effects and possible
confounds, see Kettner and Waichman, 2016). In the current
study, age was not significantly correlated with any game
decisions. In contrast, there was a significant interaction between
gender and game type. After removing three participants who
identified as neither male nor female, gender was included
in the 2 (game type) × 3 (reciprocity) repeated measures
ANOVA. This model produced a main effect for gender,
F(1,299) = 7.45, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.02, with men allocating on
average more than women, Ms = 5.86 vs. 5.50, t(299) = 2.73,
p= 0.01. However, these findings were moderated by a significant
interaction between gender and game type, F(1,299) = 10.88,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04, and between gender and reciprocity,
F(1.84,550.31)= 5.59, p= 0.01, η2p = 0.02.
Allocations by gender and game type are presented in the left
panel of Figure 3, collapsed across reciprocity conditions. The
main effect of gender appeared to be driven by men allocating
more than women in generosity games, Ms = 7.07 vs. 6.28,
t(299) = 3.41, p = 0.001, but no differently in dictator games,
t(299) = −0.58, p = 0.56. Meanwhile, men allocated more than
women in the baseline, Ms= 5.76 vs. 5.37, t(299)= 2.30, p= 0.02,
and help conditions, Ms= 6.36 vs. 5.68, t(299)= 4.00, p< 0.001,
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FIGURE 2 | Mean allocations to partner across all games. Error bars represent one standard error. N = 304 (Study 1), 256 (Study 2).
FIGURE 3 | Mean allocations to partner by game type and gender. Data are collapsed across reciprocity conditions. Error bars represent one standard error.
N = 301 (Study 1), 256 (Study 2).
but not in the hurt conditions, Ms = 5.47 vs. 5.46, t(299) = 0.05,
p = 0.96. All main effects for game type and reciprocity were
replicated when including gender.
Prosocial personality traits
Bivariate correlations between prosocial personality traits are
shown in Table 2 and were generally consistent with previous
research (Barford et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2016). Both HEXACO
honesty-humility and, to a lesser extent, HEXACO agreeableness
were more strongly correlated with politeness (rss = 0.51, 0.26)
than compassion (rss= 0.24, 0.14).
Personality Predictors of Game Allocations
Bivariate correlations
Bivariate correlations between game allocations and prosocial
personality traits are shown in Table 3 (see Supplementary
Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Material for correlations
with all personality traits). The politeness and compassion
aspects of Big Five agreeableness were both correlated with all
three dictator games (rss = 0.13–0.19). Similarly, HEXACO
honesty-humility was associated with dictator (rss = 0.12–
0.26), but not generosity (rss = −0.06 to −0.01) allocations. In
contrast, HEXACO agreeableness was correlated with generosity
(rss = 0.15–0.18) but not dictator allocations (rss = −0.01–
0.10).
Repeated measures ANCOVAs
A series of 2 (game type) × 3 (reciprocity) repeated measures
ANCOVAs was performed for each personality model with the
relevant prosocial traits standardized and entered simultaneously
as covariates. Interactions between prosocial personality traits
and game type or reciprocity are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Within the Big Five model, there was a main effect for
agreeableness, F(1,302)= 6.23, p= 0.01, η2p= 0.02. Replacing this
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TABLE 2 | Correlations between prosocial personality traits.
Study 1: Hypothetical Study 2: Incentivized
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
(1) B5 Agreeableness 0.86 0.91
(2) B5 Politeness 0.84∗∗ 0.74 0.85∗∗ 0.82
(3) B5 Compassion 0.84∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.88 0.90∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.92
(4) HEX Honesty-Humility 0.44∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.82 0.41∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.87
(5) HEX Agreeableness 0.22∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.84 0.53∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.88
Correlations calculated using Spearman’s rho. Cronbach’s αs are shown in the diagonal. B5, Big Five model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung
et al., 2007). HEX, HEXACO model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee and Ashton, 2004). N = 304 (Study 1), 256 (Study
2). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | Correlations between prosocial personality traits and game allocations.
Study 1: Hypothetical Study 2: Incentivized
DG DG0 DG15 GG GG0 GG10 DG DG0 DG15 GG GG0 GG10
Big Five model
Agreeableness 0.20∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.19∗∗ 0.11 0.18∗∗ −0.01 0.0003 −0.07
Politeness 0.17∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.02 0.07 −0.01 0.17∗∗ 0.12 0.15∗ 0.07 0.07 0.04
Compassion 0.19∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.17∗∗ 0.07 0.17∗∗ −0.09 −0.07 −0.14∗
HEXACO model
Honesty-Humility 0.20∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.06 −0.04 −0.01 0.30∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.31∗∗ −0.04 −0.02 −0.08
Agreeableness 0.10 0.03 −0.01 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.07 −0.02 0.02 0.04 0.004 −0.02
Correlations calculated using Spearman’s rho. Game allocations indicate amount allocated to partner out of 10 units (i.e., dollars or points). Big Five traits are measured
using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). HEXACO traits are measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee
and Ashton, 2004). DG, baseline dictator game. DG0, dictator game after partner’s decision cost the participant the 0 unit payoff. DG15, dictator game after partner’s
decision cost the participant the 15 unit payoff. GG, baseline generosity game. GG0, generosity game after partner’s decision cost the participant the 0 unit payoff. GG10,
generosity game after partner’s decision cost the participant the 10 unit payoff. N = 304 (Study 1), 256 (Study 2). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 4 | ANCOVA results for interactions between prosocial traits and game type.
Study 1: Hypothetical Study 2: Incentivized
Interaction term df F p η2p df F p η
2
p
Big Five model (B5A only)
Game × B5A 1, 302 0.84 0.36 0.003 1, 254 2.24 0.14 0.01
Big Five model
Game × B5Pol 1, 301 0.30 0.58 0.001 1, 253 1.97 0.16 0.01
Game × B5Comp 1, 301 0.18 0.67 0.001 1, 253 7.70 0.01 0.03
HEXACO model
Game × HEXH 1, 301 12.84 <0.001 0.04 1, 253 11.48 0.001 0.04
Game × HEXA 1, 301 9.62 0.002 0.03 1, 253 2.62 0.11 0.01
B5, Big Five model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). B5A, B5 Agreeableness. B5Comp, B5 Compassion. B5Pol, B5 Politeness.
HEX, HEXACO model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee and Ashton, 2004). HEXA, HEX Agreeableness. HEXH, HEXACO
Honesty-Humility. N = 304 (Study 1), 256 (Study 2).
with covariates for politeness and compassion initially revealed
no significant main effects for either. However, as men allocated
more than women overall (primarily driven by generosity game
allocations) and men were significantly lower on politeness and
compassion than women, we also included gender in the same
model. Here, a main effect for politeness, F(1,297) = 5.65,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.02 [and a marginally significant effect for
compassion, F(1,297) = 4.03, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.01] emerged,
suggesting that politeness was related to greater allocations
across all conditions (see Supplementary Tables S3–S5 in the
Supplementary Material). None of the prosocial personality traits
in the Big Five model interacted with game type or reciprocity.
Within the HEXACO model, there was a main effect
for agreeableness, F(1,301) = 9.28, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.03,
but not honesty-humility F(1,301) = 0.71, p = 0.40,
η2p = 0.002. This was accompanied by significant interactions
between honesty-humility and game type, F(1,301) = 12.84,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04, and agreeableness and game type,
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TABLE 5 | ANCOVA results for interactions between prosocial traits and reciprocity.
Study 1: Hypothetical Study 2: Incentivized
Interaction term df F p η2p df F p η
2
p
Big Five model (B5A only)
Reciprocity × B5A 1.83, 551.89 0.04 0.95 <0.001 1.89, 478.90 0.19 0.82 0.001
Big Five model
Reciprocity × B5Pol 1.83, 550.24 0.22 0.78 0.001 1.89, 477.05 0.18 0.83 0.001
Reciprocity × B5Comp 1.83, 550.24 0.20 0.80 0.001 1.89, 477.05 0.002 0.99 <0.001
HEXACO model
Reciprocity × HEXH 1.84, 553.30 4.42 0.02 0.01 1.89, 478.16 0.17 0.84 0.001
Reciprocity × HEXA 1.84, 553.30 0.78 0.45 0.003 1.89, 478.16 1.87 0.16 0.01
B5, Big Five model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). B5A, B5 Agreeableness. B5Comp, B5 Compassion. B5Pol, B5 Politeness.
HEX, HEXACO model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee and Ashton, 2004). HEXA, HEX Agreeableness. HEXH, HEXACO
Honesty-Humility. N = 304 (Study 1), 256 (Study 2).
F(1,301) = 9.62, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.03. This pattern of
findings was replicated when gender was included in the
model (see Supplementary Tables S3–S5 in the Supplementary
Material).
To follow up on these interactions, we examined the
effect of these two traits for dictator and generosity games
separately, which revealed a “double dissociation” between the
two, depicted in the left panel of Figure 4. Honesty-humility
was uniquely associated with greater allocations in dictator
games, F(1,301) = 23.77, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, but did
not have a main effect in generosity games, F(1,301) = 2.32,
p = 0.13, η2p = 0.01. In contrast, HEXACO agreeableness was
uniquely associated with greater allocations in generosity games,
F(1,301) = 11.88, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04, but did not have a
main effect in dictator games, F(1,301) = 0.0004, p = 0.98,
η2p < 0.001.
In addition, there was a significant interaction between
honesty-humility and reciprocity, F(1.84,553.30) = 4.42,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.01. This revealed a significant main effect
of honesty-humility in the hurt conditions, F(1,301) = 5.94,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.02, but not in the baseline or help conditions
(ps= 0.99, 0.49, respectively).
Summary
The results of Study 1 showed clear evidence of social
preferences beyond inequality aversion and egalitarianism.
Individuals allocated significantly more wealth to their partners
when decisions were costless than when they were costly,
demonstrating tendencies toward generosity. In addition,
there was evidence of positive reciprocity, with individuals
allocating more wealth to their partner after their partner
had assisted them. However, we found no evidence of
negative reciprocity, and individuals did not allocate any
differently when they had been denied a higher payoff by
a hurtful partner. These findings were further moderated
by gender, with men allocating more than women in the
generosity games and when their partner had not previously hurt
them.
The results presented a mixed picture of predicted and
unexpected findings regarding the role of personality, revealing
a main effect for politeness (but not so much compassion)
in the Big Five model. In the HEXACO model, honesty-
humility predicted greater allocations in the dictator game,
in keeping with a large body of previous research (Hilbig
and Zettler, 2009; Hilbig et al., 2015a; Zhao and Smillie,
2015). However, contrary to its putative mechanism of
benevolence, honesty-humility did not play any role in the
generosity game, where decisions were costless. Here, it was
HEXACO agreeableness—or the tendency to be tolerant,
lenient, and forgiving—which instead predicted greater
generosity.
An important consideration in Study 1 is that the decisions
were hypothetical, featuring imagined partners and stakes.
Previous studies have been conflicted as to whether hypothetical
paradigms produce comparable results to incentivized games,
especially when trait effects are involved (Ben-Ner et al., 2008;
Engel, 2011; Lönnqvist et al., 2011; Ferguson and Starmer,
2013; Hilbig et al., 2015a; Zhao et al., 2016). Another potential
limitation stems from correlating self-reported personality traits
with self-reported hypothetical responses, where there is a risk
of inflated associations arising from common method variance
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Finally, the dearth of actual assessment
of behavior has been a prominent issue in personality research,
leading to calls for a broader range of data beyond self-
reports and hypothetical scenarios (Funder, 2001; Baumeister
et al., 2007). In light of these concerns, we ran a second
study using an identical—but incentivized—paradigm with the
aim of replicating our previous findings and identifying robust
effects.
STUDY 2
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Advisory Group of
the Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University
of Melbourne. All participants provided informed consent via an
electronic survey according to the established guidelines of the
Group.
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FIGURE 4 | Comparison of game allocations between the highest and lowest quartiles of HEXACO Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Agreeableness.
(Left) Study 1 (hypothetical), (right) Study 2 (incentivized). Data are collapsed across reciprocity conditions. Error bars represent one standard error. N = 304 (Study
1), 256 (Study 2).
Participants
The final sample consisted of 256 North American participants
(aged 19–67 years, Mage = 34.76, SD = 11.00; 43% female)
recruited from Amazon MTurk.
Personality Measures
Participants completed the 100-item BFAS (DeYoung et al.,
2007), along with the honesty-humility, agreeableness, and
altruism scales (see Footnote 1) from the HEXACO-PI-R (Lee
and Ashton, 2004), described in Study 1.
Procedure
Participants completed the same demographic questions,
personality measures, and economic games as Study 1, which
were again programmed using Qualtrics Survey Software and
administered through the MTurk requester interface. This time,
however, the BFAS was presented before the HEXACO-PI-R
and the two were separated by several other questionnaires
(e.g., Major Life Goals, Roberts and Robins, 2000). In addition,
the games of interest were preceded by a social mindfulness
task involving the hypothetical selection of specific objects
(Van Doesum et al., 2013) and subjective ratings of the payoff
structures of social dilemmas (Halevy et al., 2012), both of which
were beyond the scope of the aims of the current research.
Neither involved any explicit themes of prosociality and were not
expected to produce any carryover effects.
Unlike Study 1, participants’ responses to all games were
financially incentivized. This was done by informing participants
that their decisions for one of the games (which was pre-selected)
would be matched to another participant and used to determine
their payment at the end of the session. This approach is similar
to the Conditional Information Lottery, which is a standard
procedure in the literature (Bardsley, 2000). In the help and
hurt reciprocity conditions, participants were asked to indicate
their responses using the strategy method and assume that they
would be matched to a partner who had picked a given move.
Game payoffs were represented by points that corresponded
with real dollar amounts at a rate of 1 point to US$0.10.
Bonus payments were then provided to participants at the end
of the study using their anonymous response identification
codes.
Participants completed the same two attention checks as in
Study 1. Ten participants (3.8%) were excluded for failing at least
one of these checks. The show-up fee was US$8.00, in addition to
bonus payments earned from study tasks (US$0.50). The median
time spent on the study was 42 min.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Statistics
Game decisions
Mean allocations to a partner are presented in the right panel of
Figure 2. Comparing across studies, all three dictator allocations
were significantly lower in the incentivized Study 2 than the
hypothetical Study 1 (ps < 0.001). Conversely, all but one
generosity allocation (where a partner had previously helped the
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participant, p = 0.16) were significantly higher in Study 2 than
Study 1 (ps < 0.05).
A 2 (game type: dictator vs. generosity) × 3 (reciprocity:
baseline, help, and hurt) repeated measures ANOVA was
performed with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for sphericity
violations of reciprocity, χ2(2) = 16.00, p < 0.001 (ε = 0.94),
and its interaction with game type, χ2(2) = 10.34, p = 0.01
(ε = 0.96). The results in Study 1 were replicated here, including
main effects for game type, F(1,255) = 253.20, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.50, and reciprocity, F(1.89,480.67) = 9.40, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.04. There was also an interaction between game type
and reciprocity, F(1.92,490.44) = 3.87, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.02,
which had been marginally significant (p = 0.09) in Study 1.
Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed that
the effect for reciprocity applied only to dictator games. Dictator
allocations were significantly higher in the help games (M= 3.74)
compared with the baseline (M = 3.20, p < 0.001), and hurt
games (M = 3.28, p < 0.001), but there were no significant
differences across reciprocity conditions for the generosity games
(all ps > 0.30).
Demographic variables
Again, age was not significantly correlated with any game
decisions. There was an interaction between gender and game
type when gender was included in the 2 (game type) × 3
(reciprocity) repeated measures ANOVA, F(1,254) = 15.32,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.06, shown in the right panel of Figure 3.
Women allocated significantly more than men in dictator games,
Ms = 3.79 vs. 3.13, t(254) = 2.59, p = 0.01, but this was reversed
in the generosity game, where, as in Study 1, men allocated
significantly more than women, Ms= 7.57 vs. 6.45, t(254)= 3.38,
p = 0.001. All main effects and interactions for game type and
reciprocity were replicated when including gender.
Prosocial personality traits
Bivariate correlations between prosocial personality traits are
shown in Table 2 and were generally consistent with those in
Study 1. However, HEXACO agreeableness was more strongly
correlated with all other prosocial traits in Study 2 than in
Study 1.
Personality Predictors of Game Allocations
Bivariate correlations
Bivariate correlations between game allocations and prosocial
personality traits are shown in Table 3 (see Supplementary
Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Material for correlations
with all personality traits). Compared with Study 1, a stronger
pattern of correlations was seen for honesty-humility, where it
was again associated with dictator (rss = 0.21–0.31)—but not
generosity (rss = −0.08 to −0.02)—allocations. In contrast to
Study 1, however, HEXACO agreeableness was not associated
with allocations in any game (rss=−0.02–0.07).
Repeated measures ANCOVAs
A series of 2 (game type) × 3 (reciprocity) repeated measures
ANCOVAs was again performed for each personality model with
the relevant traits standardized and entered simultaneously as
covariates (see Tables 4 and 5; Figure 4).
Within the Big Five model, there was again a main effect for
agreeableness, F(1,254) = 7.12, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.03. Replacing
this with covariates for politeness and compassion revealed
a unique main effect for politeness only, F(1,253) = 17.89,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07, and not compassion, F(1,253) = 1.87,
p = 0.17, η2p = 0.01. Unlike Study 1, there was a significant
interaction between compassion and game type, F(1,253)= 7.70,
p= 0.01, η2p = 0.03. Follow-up analysis revealed that compassion
was associated with lower allocations in generosity games,
F(1,253) = 7.20, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.03, but did not have a
main effect in dictator games when politeness was controlled for,
F(1,253)= 2.39, p= 0.12, η2p = 0.01.
Within the HEXACO model, there was a main effect for
honesty-humility, F(1,253) = 7.02, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.03, but
not agreeableness F(1,253) = 0.003, p = 0.95, η2p < 0.001.
Whereas the interaction for HEXACO agreeableness observed
in Study 1 fell short of significance here, F(1,253) = 2.62,
p = 0.11, η2p = 0.01, there was again a significant interaction
between honesty-humility and game type, F(1,253) = 11.48,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04. As in Study 1, this revealed a
significant positive effect of honesty-humility in dictator games,
F(1,253) = 26.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10, but not in generosity
games, F(1,253)= 0.68, p= 0.41, η2p = 0.003.
The above analyses were repeated and the findings were largely
the same when gender was included as an additional term (see
Supplementary Tables S3–S5 in the Supplementary Material).
Summary
The incentivized results of Study 2 replicated many of the main
findings from the hypothetical paradigm of Study 1. Again,
there was clear evidence of inequality aversion, generosity, and
positive reciprocity, which were moderated by gender. When
we examined the role of prosocial personality traits, honesty-
humility once more interacted with game type, predicting greater
allocations in dictator—but not generosity—games. In the Big
Five model, we again observed a main effect of politeness—but
not compassion—which was globally and uniquely associated
with greater allocations across all games.
However, the results of Study 2 also introduced two non-trivial
differences compared with Study 1. First, the previous interaction
between agreeableness and game type in the HEXACO model
disappeared in the incentivized paradigm. In fact, HEXACO
agreeableness was not associated with allocations of any kind.
Second, a novel and unpredicted interaction with game type
emerged for compassion in the Big Five model, in which it was
not related to dictator allocations, but predicted lower allocations
in the generosity game, once politeness was controlled for. This
combination of consistent and less consistent findings across
the two studies demonstrates the importance of replication and
comparisons across incentivized and hypothetical paradigms.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Prosociality is a complex, multidimensional construct, yet
previous research on personality and social preferences has
largely focused on simple games and broad trait domains.
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Expanding on this literature, we developed a novel behavioral
paradigm (inspired by Charness and Rabin, 2002), which
integrated multiple social preferences using slight variations of
the dictator game. We ran two studies—one with hypothetical
decisions and one with incentivized games—across two large,
and relatively diverse community samples to identify consistent
effects. The findings provide clear evidence of inequality
aversion, generosity, and positive reciprocity, which we mapped
to a framework of distinct prosocial personality traits. This
highlighted the unique roles of politeness from the Big Five
model, honesty-humility from the HEXACO model, and more
tentatively, traits reflecting irritability, anger, and (a lack of)
tolerance and forgiveness.
The sizes for these effects are consistent with those previously
observed for the role of personality in economic games, where
the sample-size weighted average correlation with dictator
allocations was rs = 0.20 for Big Five agreeableness (Zhao et al.,
2016) and rs = 0.25 and r = 0.29 for HEXACO honesty-humility
(Hilbig et al., 2015a; Zhao et al., 2016). Though they may initially
appear modest, these correlations—particularly for HEXACO
honesty-humility—are at least as large as the average effect size in
social and personality psychology (r = 0.21; Richard et al., 2003;
Fraley and Marks, 2007), and fall within the middle third of effect
sizes in psychology as a whole (Hemphill, 2003). These findings
will be discussed in detail in the following sections, with a focus
on the robust and replicable effects across both two studies.
Beyond Egalitarianism: Evidence for
Generosity and Positive Reciprocity
In line with a large body of literature, our two studies showed
that humans are responsive to additional social preferences that
stray from both narrow self-interest and inequality aversion.
The findings from the generosity game correspond to previous
research showing that many individuals are willing to assist
others even when it means being relatively less well off, as
long as absolute costs are minimal (Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Güth et al., 2012). Generosity may
be crowded out by the trade-off between self- and other-interests
in the dictator game, but when it is costless, “most of us try
to make the world a better place” (Güth et al., 2009, p. 13).
Likewise, many real-world gestures of prosociality, such as giving
directions to a stranger and offering a seat on public transport,
are ubiquitous precisely because they are relatively inexpensive
forms of benevolence.
In contrast, we found mixed results for reciprocity, with
consistent evidence of positive—but not negative—reciprocity
across both studies. This supports the idea that negative and
positive reciprocity are indeed independent processes and are
not driven by the same motivations (Yamagishi et al., 2012;
Ackermann et al., 2014). Our results are also reminiscent of the
original findings by Charness and Rabin (2002), where there
was evidence of positive reciprocity but fewer acts of negative
reciprocity, even when it was free to punish a misbehaving
partner. This may reflect similar sentiments as those in the
generosity game, in that individuals are generally benevolent—or
at least non-spiteful—when the stakes are relatively inexpensive.
In addition, we found no consistent effects for personality
with respect to positive or negative reciprocity, suggesting
that individual differences in the propensity to reciprocate are
subsumed more generally within broader prosocial tendencies.
Other factors may also contribute to the lack of negative
reciprocity in our data. First, all decisions in the games were
gain-framed. Even when a partner “hurt” a participant, it
simply prevented them from receiving a higher amount rather
than incurring a personal loss, which may have been too
weak to provoke negative reciprocity. Second, the initial payoff
combination (15 for the participant, 10 for the partner) declined
by the partner in the hurt conditions of the dictator game was
already unequal, which may have convinced participants that
their partner’s decision to pass on this offer was justified and not
deserving of retaliation. Third, the assessment of different social
preferences within a single paradigm may trigger a desire among
participants to behave consistently, thus artificially increasing
consistency in behavior and nullifying any effects for negative
reciprocity. However, the differential patterns of responding
across generosity and positive reciprocity conditions provide
evidence against any such response set. Future investigations
using loss-framed manipulations, different configurations of
payoffs, and measurements separated by time may be more
appropriate for investigating negative reciprocity.
Women More Egalitarian, Men More
Generous?
One interesting finding to emerge across both studies was the
interaction between gender and game type, with men consistently
allocating more than women in the (costless) generosity games.
In the (costly) dictator game, however, women allocated more
than men in incentivized games while there were no gender
differences in hypothetical responses. But given that decisions
in the latter are already a costless form of prosociality—relying
on words rather than actions—the absence of a gender gap
here may reflect overestimates of allocations among men relative
to women. Hence, while women were more inequality averse,
they were not necessarily more altruistic when this involved
promoting the welfare of others over and above their own.
Although these results were unpredicted and unrelated to the
aims of this research, they provide a clear replication of previous
research on gender and social preferences. Several studies have
shown that women are more prosocial in simple dictator games,
while men are more prosocial when the price of giving drops
and when giving or cooperating maximizes efficiency (Eckel
and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Croson
and Gneezy, 2009; Kuhn and Villeval, 2015). Even in middle
childhood and early adolescence, girls more often than boys select
egalitarian allocations of wealth over both selfish and generous
allocations (Fehr et al., 2013).
These findings correspond to a wider literature on gender
differences in preferences toward social and political inequality
(i.e., social dominance orientation), which are largely stable
across nations and cultures (Pratto et al., 1994, 1997; Sidanius
et al., 2000). Such differences in egalitarianism are believed to
arise from evolutionary differences in reproductive strategies, in
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particular, the accumulation of economic resources and status
for male, rather than female, reproductive success (Sidanius
et al., 2000). Similarly, the literature on desirable mate qualities
and costly signaling indicates that men may engage in greater
acts of conspicuous consumption as a display of generosity and
resources to increase prestige and status (Griskevicius et al.,
2007). In the current paradigm, the safest and easiest way of doing
this without putting one’s actual stakes at risk is through costless
allocations in the generosity game.
Politeness as a General Prosocial
Tendency in Economic Games
A prominent finding was that the politeness aspect of Big Five
agreeableness consistently predicted greater overall allocations in
both studies. Although we observed a trend for a main effect of
compassion when decisions were hypothetical, this disappeared
altogether in the incentivized paradigm. These results are in
keeping with previous research demonstrating that politeness—
rather than compassion—drives egalitarian allocations in the
dictator game, with the divergence between the two clearest in
incentivized rather than hypothetical paradigms (Zhao et al.,
2016).
This unique effect of politeness suggests that prosociality
in these decontextualized and neutrally framed paradigms is a
function of the tendency to respect others and to adhere to
social norms rather than emotional concern for others’ wellbeing.
While compassion plays a fundamental role in real-world forms
of prosociality (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Bekkers, 2006)
and the related construct of empathy is theorized to be the
primary conduit through which humans engage in altruistic
behavior (Batson, 1991), compassionate motives may not be
elicited given the impersonal nature of economic games. This has
important implications for the ecological validity of economic
games, suggesting that social preferences and behaviors measured
in these games only capture a limited form of norm-based
prosociality. Indeed, in their commentary more than 20 years
ago, Camerer and Thaler (1995) argued that the outcomes of such
games reveal more about the economics of manners and etiquette
than they do about altruism, which is empirically supported by
the current findings.
HEXACO Honesty-Humility,
Agreeableness, and the Limits of
Prosociality
A second major finding to appear consistently across studies
was the interaction between honesty-humility and game type,
where it predicted greater allocations in the dictator game but
played no role in the generosity game. Honesty-Humility has
been consistently linked to fair and prosocial (or at least the
absence of antisocial) behaviors when there are personal profits to
be made, such as delinquency (e.g., stealing money; Dunlop et al.,
2012), workplace ethics and integrity (Lee et al., 2005; Cohen
et al., 2014), and dishonesty (Hilbig and Zettler, 2015). Notably,
across both Big Five and HEXACO models, honesty-humility is
the trait most strongly and frequently associated with dictator
allocations (Zhao and Smillie, 2015). Surprisingly, we found that
this link to prosociality disappears when such decisions do not
involve a personal cost. In the generosity game where individuals
could maximize their partner’s payoffs for free, those high on
honesty-humility allocated no differently from their low-scoring
counterparts.
On the one hand, this implies that there are limits on the
prosociality encompassed by honesty-humility, and, contrary to
previous evidence (Hilbig et al., 2015b), suggests that honesty-
humility is more closely tied to egalitarianism and fairness than
benevolence. On the other hand, further inspection of Figure 4
shows that this interaction is more strongly driven by those
at the low pole of honesty-humility. Although they are selfish
when they can personally profit, they are neither competitive
nor vindictive—and indeed appear concerned about efficiency—
once their own stakes are secured.3 These results highlight the
importance of situational context in the expression of personality
traits: Given that HEXACO honesty-humility represents the
tendency to cooperate with others despite the opportunity for
exploitation (i.e., active cooperation), it is no longer elicited
when there is no invitation to exploit in the non-constant-sum
structure of the generosity game4.
It is noteworthy that these findings for honesty-humility
were accompanied by a complementary pattern of results
for HEXACO agreeableness in the hypothetical games. While
HEXACO agreeableness did not predict dictator allocations,
consistent with previous research (Hilbig et al., 2013), it was
associated with greater allocations in the generosity game. These
findings are in keeping with the core features of HEXACO
agreeableness, which capture individual differences in tolerance,
lenience, flexibility, and a lack of irritability or anger (Ashton
and Lee, 2007; Ashton et al., 2014). All of these tendencies
are antithetical to spite and envy, two major motivations
for curbing a partner’s allocation in the generosity game.
Nevertheless, we interpret this double dissociation with caution
as it was not replicated in the incentivized paradigm, where
HEXACO agreeableness was unrelated to any form of social
preference.
Interestingly, however, we observed a near-identical
interaction for the volatility aspect of Big Five neuroticism
in the incentivized paradigm, which captures related constructs
(i.e., anger and irritability; DeYoung et al., 2007, DeYoung,
2015) and is strongly negatively associated with HEXACO
agreeableness (rss = −0.60, −0.62 in Studies 1 and 2,
respectively). Bivariate correlations and exploratory analyses
for volatility (see Supplementary Tables S1 and S6 in the
Supplementary Material) showed a similar but inverted pattern
to that previously seen for HEXACO agreeableness. Volatility
has been linked to psychopathic traits (Jonason et al., 2013), and
may provoke envy and resentfulness when individuals face the
prospect of disadvantageous inequality in the generosity game.
3A future extension is to examine these distinct prosocial traits at an even finer level
of analysis, as honesty-humility too can be broken down into four facets: sincerity,
greed avoidance, fairness, and modesty (Lee and Ashton, 2004). Our own data
indicate a main effect for the modesty facet in both incentivized and hypothetical
studies, while the interaction between honesty-humility and game type was driven
by sincerity in Study 1 and fairness in Study 2.
4We thank one of our reviewers for this observation.
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Does Incentivization Pay Off?
The dual studies and their near-identical designs provide
a useful comparison of trait effects across incentivized and
hypothetical designs, which has been a topic of debate among
psychologists and economists (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;
Ariely and Norton, 2007). Recent investigations of prosocial
traits in the dictator game suggest that while average allocations
drop between hypothetical and incentivized designs, the effects
of certain traits—politeness and agreeableness from the Big
Five model, and HEXACO honesty-humility—tend to be larger
in incentivized paradigms (Zhao et al., 2016). Likewise, we
also observed considerable discrepancies in average allocations
between the two paradigms, with individuals overestimating
dictator allocations when providing hypothetical responses. Such
“hypothetical biases” are frequently seen in value elicitation
methods, in which individuals overstate their willingness to pay
for a given good (in this case, equality; Hertwig and Ortmann,
2001; List and Gallet, 2001). Yet, individuals also underestimated
how benevolent or efficiency-maximizing they would be in the
generosity game. It appears that in the absence of incentivization,
all individuals gravitate toward the equality norm, leading to
attenuated individual variation and muted trait effects. With
incentivization, new trait effects emerged, including interactions
for compassion and volatility. These can be understood in
relation to a recent meta-analysis on the role of personality traits
in cooperative game behaviors, which found moderating effects
of incentivisation on Big Five agreeableness and neuroticism
(Ferguson et al., 2015). With incentivization, the effect for
agreeableness became stronger while the effect for neuroticism
went from weakly positive to negative.
CONCLUSION
There have been recent calls for an integrated research agenda
between personality psychology and economics (Ferguson et al.,
2011). In the current research, we mapped two models of
personality onto individual differences in social preferences using
a parsimonious behavioral paradigm. In the HEXACO model,
honesty-humility (but not agreeableness) uniquely predicted
egalitarian, but not generous, allocations of wealth. In the
Big Five model, the politeness (but not compassion) aspect of
agreeableness was uniquely associated with prosocial allocations
of wealth more globally. The findings revealed important insights
concerning the sources of heterogeneity in social preferences and
the mechanisms driving prosocial behavior in economic games.
Together, they demonstrate the value of a joint approach that
combines theoretical predictions from personality psychology
with behavioral paradigms from experimental economics.
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